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GIVE ME LIBERTY TO CHOOSE (A BETTER) DEATH: 
RESPECTING AUTONOMY MORE FULLY IN ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVE STATUTES 
KATHY L. CERMINARA* AND JOSEPH R. KADIS** 
ABSTRACT 
In the name of state interests, advance directive statutes almost universally 
include language requiring that a patient be in a particular physical state as a 
condition precedent to operation of a directive. This article urges state 
legislatures to recognize and rectify the conflict they have created by imposing 
such triggering conditions. First, it examines states’ efforts to facilitate 
autonomous end-of-life decision making through advance directive statutes. 
Then it proposes amending those statutes to align the law with medical ethics 
by eliminating specified physical triggering conditions burdening the exercise 
of patients’ rights to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Such amendment will 
improve end-of-life care and serve as an expression of a more caring medical 
and legal culture. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Death affects us all. Barring medical miracles, none of us will escape it, 
and most of us will witness the passing of numerous relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances over our lifetimes. Perhaps an elderly grandfather will pass 
away after years of slow decline into and endurance through Alzheimer’s 
Disease, requiring medically supplied nutrition and hydration.1 Perhaps a 
neighbor, a Jehovah’s Witness, will pass away after refusing a blood 
transfusion, acceptance of which is against his faith.2 A good friend’s mother-
in-law may exist in a vegetative state, non-communicative and non-cognitive,3 
yet sustained by medically-supplied nutrition and hydration for years before 
dying.4 
Just as the medical conditions of all those people will vary, so too may 
their preferences for treatment near the end of life. All of them have the right 
to refuse even life-sustaining treatment, not just under the common law but 
also under state and federal constitutional law.5 If they are able to understand 
and appreciate the situation and voice their own preferences at the time such 
refusal becomes an issue, they have nearly carte blanche liberty to exercise 
their autonomy to refuse it.6 Yet if they depend on documents executed in 
accordance with state advance directive statutes to ensure that their wishes are 
followed when they are unable to do so, they risk having their wishes ignored, 
 
 1. See Lou Cannon, Foreword to CRAIG SHIRLEY, LAST ACT: THE FINAL YEARS AND 
EMERGING LEGACY OF RONALD REAGAN xiv (2015) (noting former President Ronald Reagan, 
for example, revealed his diagnosis with Alzheimer’s Disease to the public in a letter dated 
November 5, 1994. It was more than nine years later, on June 5, 2004, that he passed away. The 
time in between, according to former First Lady of the United States, Nancy Reagan, “taught her 
a crash course in patience.”). See also ALAN MEISEL ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE END OF 
LIFE DECISION MAKING § 6.04(E)(2) at 6-121 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d. ed. 2015) (explaining many 
patients with late-stage Alzheimer’s Disease require feeding through medical means, known 
casually but misleadingly as tube-feeding). 
 2. See Lozada Tirado v. Flecha, 2010 WL 446020, at *2 (P.R. Offic. Trans. 2010). 
 3. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Law, Perception and Cultural Cognition, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 
597, 607 (2016) (discussing recent research investigating just what level of awareness persons in 
vegetative state and the closely related minimally conscious state may possess). 
 4. See generally In re Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (involving an elderly 
woman receiving nutrition and hydration for years after a stroke). The Browning court used, and 
the applicable Florida statute uses, the term persistent vegetative state, but medical personnel use 
the term persistent vegetative state differently from legal sources in many circumstances. Id. 
Technically, a persistent vegetative state is a precursor to the irreversible permanent vegetative 
state, but the law generally uses persistent vegetative state to refer to both. See Cerminara, supra 
note 3, at 602 n. 29. This article will use the more general term vegetative state throughout, with 
the understanding that whatever term the law uses, it is likely that the person in a vegetative state 
in any given case has been deemed to be in an irreversible condition. See generally id. 
 5. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with FLA. CONST. art 1, § 2. See infra Part 
III.A.1. 
 6. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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even if they properly executed the documents.7 While protecting autonomous, 
anticipatory medical decision making, the statutes also impose limitations on 
complying with patients’ instructions in the name of safeguarding state 
interests. 
This article demonstrates that state legislatures must recognize and rectify 
the conflict they have created by imposing such triggering conditions. First, it 
examines states’ efforts to facilitate autonomous end-of-life decision making 
through advance directive statutes. Then it proposes amending those statutes to 
align the law with medical ethics by eliminating specified physical triggering 
conditions burdening the exercise of patients’ rights to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment. 
II.  ADVANCE DIRECTIVE STATUTES: MEMORIALIZING PATIENT DECISIONS FOR 
FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION 
State legislatures enact advance directive statutes to regulate the exercise 
of citizens’ pre-existing common-law and constitutional rights to make their 
own medical decisions. The statutes are not sources of rights; instead, they 
codify and regulate the exercise of citizens’ liberty to control their own bodies 
and shape their own destinies.8 California enacted the first advance directive 
statute in 1976; now all states have enacted them in a variety of forms.9 Many 
incorporate physical triggering conditions, which can thwart patients’ wishes.10 
A. The Advance Directive Spectrum 
Advance directives vary greatly, but they have one common distinctive 
feature: They become effective only if and when patients cannot make medical 
 
 7. See, e.g., J. Clint Parker & Daniel S. Goldberg, A Legal and Ethical Analysis of the 
Effects of Triggering Conditions on Surrogate Decision-Making in End-of-Life Care in the US, 28 
HEC F. 11, 13–14 (2016) (describing a case in which a child did not meet the triggering 
conditions of the North Carolina advance directive. Her parents and medical team all agreed that 
withdrawal of ventilator support was ethically and morally appropriate, but hospital risk 
management personnel argued that withdrawal would violate North Carolina law because the 
child did not meet either of that state’s statutory physical triggering conditions). That case differs 
from those at issue in this article because the child in that case did not, and indeed could not have, 
executed a valid written advance directive. Written advance directives are not required for 
withdrawing treatment, but the case for withdrawal regardless of whether the triggering 
conditions are met is even stronger in a case in which a patient has executed a written advance 
directive. 
 8. See MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.03[A], at 7-31, § 7.03[B], at 7-33; see also id. § 
7.03[B], at 7-33–34 (explaining most, if not all, advance directive statutes themselves state that 
they are not the sources of the rights, but are merely the path to exercise those rights; a citizen’s 
rights are far broader than those stated within the statutes). 
 9. See id. § 7.01[A], at 7-7; see also id. § 7.13 (noting advance directive statutes and 
tables). 
 10. See Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 15–16 tbl. 1. 
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decisions themselves.11 Until that point, patients speak for themselves. It is 
only when patients can no longer do so that caregivers and health care 
providers should follow the wishes set forth in their patients’ advance 
directives.12 
Advance directives can be either oral or written,13 but most people think of 
written documents when hearing the term. Indeed, there is some advantage to 
putting wishes in writing. In some states, for example, doing so will establish a 
presumption that those wishes are to be followed.14 There are also drawbacks, 
however, to writing lengthy instructions about numerous treatments, diseases, 
and conditions; being too specific about which treatments should be withheld 
or withdrawn, for example, can improperly imply that a treatment omitted from 
the document must be started or continued.15 
A common way to categorize advance directives is to consider them as 
giving instructions or appointing a person to speak after the declarant cannot.16 
Among written documents, an instructional advance directive is the type of 
document commonly known as a living will: a document in which a person 
sets forth her wishes to guide end-of-life medical treatment after she has lost 
decision-making capacity.17 In a proxy directive—variously called a durable 
health care power of attorney, a health care surrogate designation, or a proxy 
designation, among other names—the patient appoints a trusted person to 
speak on her behalf when she has lost the capacity to do so.18 Without drafting 
documents, a person instead could verbally instruct her family or friends about 
those treatment preferences, appoint one or more of them to carry out her 
wishes, or both. This article focuses specifically on patients who have executed 
written advance directives, leaving similar issues faced by those who have not 
done so for another day.19 
 
 11. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.02[B], at 7-22. 
 12. Id. (“An advance directive goes into effect not only at a future time . . . but also only if 
the patient has lost the capacity to make a decision about treatment at that time”); see also id. 
§ 7.06[A][1]. But see FLA. STAT. § 765.202(6) (permitting patient to assign power to a surrogate 
to exercise while patient still retains capacity). 
 13. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.01[B][1], at 7-8. 
 14. See In re Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990) (“[A] written declaration or 
designation of proxy, in the absence of any evidence of intent to the contrary, establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that constitutes clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes”). 
 15. Kathy L. Cerminara, An Analysis of H.701, University of Miami Ethics Programs 4 (Feb. 
25, 2005), https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/ethics/documents/schivao/030805-HB701-Legal 
Analysis.pdf. 
 16. See, e.g., MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.01[B][3]–[4]. It is also possible to combine 
both types of advance directives into one document. Id. § 7.01[B][7]. 
 17. Id. § 7.01[B][3]. 
 18. Id. § 7.01[B][4]. 
 19. Those people who have executed written advance directives, after all, have done all that 
medical providers and lawyers can suggest to assure that their future care proceeds in accordance 
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B. Statutory Limitations and Their Purposes 
Importantly for purposes of this article, in addition to requiring incapacity 
before advance directives become effective, many state statutes include 
language requiring that a patient be in a particular physical state as a condition 
precedent to operation of an advance directive.20 For example, Missouri 
statutes provide that a living will becomes operative only when the patient is in 
a “terminal condition.”21 The Pennsylvania statute states that a living will is 
effective when a patient is in an “end-stage medical condition” or 
“permanently unconscious.”22 The Florida Legislature has specified three 
physical triggering conditions: (1) “terminal condition,” (2) “end-stage 
condition,” and (3) “persistent vegetative state.”23 
 
with their wishes. A written advance directive is not required to refuse treatment, and in fact those 
with written advance directives are far from a majority of Americans. Jaya K. Rao et al., 
Completion of Advance Directives Among U.S. Consumers, 46(1) AM. J. PREV. MED. 65, 68 
(2014) (reporting that only 26.3 percent of almost 8,000 U.S. adults surveyed nationwide in 2009 
and 2010 had advance directives). The group of individuals not likely to have an advance 
directive, however, is the population most disadvantaged by faulty drafting of advance directive 
statutes. See id. at 68–69. 
 20. See generally MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.02[C] (“Under many statutes, advance 
directives are not effective unless the patient is in a terminal condition or permanently 
unconscious . . . .”). See also Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 15–16. 
 21. MO. REV. STAT. § 459.025 (2000). Missouri defines a “terminal condition” as being “an 
incurable or irreversible condition which, in the opinion of the attending physician, is such that 
death will occur within a short time regardless of the application of medical procedures.” Id. 
§ 459.010(6). 
 22. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5443(a) (2012). In Pennsylvania, an “end-stage medical 
condition” is: 
An incurable and irreversible medical condition in an advanced state caused by injury, 
disease or physical illness that will, in the opinion of the attending physician to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, result in death, despite the introduction or 
continuation of medical treatment. Except as specifically set forth in an advance health 
care directive, the term is not intended to preclude treatment of a disease, illness or 
physical, mental, cognitive or intellectual condition, even if incurable and irreversible and 
regardless of severity, if both of the following apply: 
  (1) The patient would benefit from the medical treatment, including palliative care. 
  (2) Such treatment would not merely prolong the process of dying. 
Id. § 5422. A patient is “permanently unconscious” when: 
A medical condition that has been diagnosed in accordance with currently accepted 
medical standards and with reasonable medical certainty as total and irreversible loss of 
consciousness and capacity for interaction with the environment. The term includes, 
without limitation, an irreversible vegetative state or irreversible coma. Id. 
 23. FLA. STAT. § 765.302(1) (2016). Florida defines a “terminal condition” as “a condition 
caused by injury, disease, or illness from which there is no reasonable medical probability of 
recovery and which, without treatment, can be expected to cause death;” an “end-stage condition” 
as “an irreversible condition that is caused by injury, disease, or illness which has resulted in 
progressively severe and permanent deterioration, and which, to a reasonable degree of medical 
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Such statutory physical triggering conditions can add an extra layer of 
complexity to some patients’ end-of-life care. On one hand, statutory forms 
incorporating those physical triggering conditions restrict application to only 
some patients.24 On the other hand, a patient’s advance directive can differ 
from the terms of her state’s statute; such differences are common and the 
advance directive perfectly valid in some, if not all, states because advance 
directive statutes are not the source of the right to refuse treatment. They 
merely facilitate the exercise of pre-existing common-law and constitutional 
rights to do so.25 Some state statutes even explicitly remind citizens of the 
validity of advance directives other than those created by completing statutory 
advance directive forms.26 Some non-statutory directives incorporate different 
physical triggering conditions, while others do not name particular physical 
conditions at all. Some may include physical triggering conditions but 
internally define those triggering conditions differently from the way the 
applicable statute defines them. In such a case, the issue becomes whether 
medical professionals should follow the patient’s stated wishes or still should 
require that the patient meet the legal definition of one of the state’s physical 
triggering conditions because the statute requires that condition be present for 
the statutory advance directive to take effect.27 
As a result, it is possible for a patient in Florida to have a valid living will 
that simply provides that she wants “to refuse any and all efforts to artificially 
prolong her life,” without including any physical triggering conditions at all.28 
It is also possible for a Jehovah’s Witness to have a valid living will saying 
 
probability, treatment of the condition would be ineffective;” and a “persistent vegetative state” 
“a permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) the absence of 
voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind; [and] (b) an inability to communicate or 
interact purposefully with the environment.” Id. § 765.101(22), (4), (15). 
 24. See, e.g., LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH 
DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 135 (2009) (“The Florida form would not cover a person in a 
minimally conscious state or a person who was profoundly disabled.”). 
 25. See MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.01[B][8], at 7–15 (“An advance directive need not 
necessarily be drafted in accordance with a statute.”). MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1, § 7.03[B][2]–
[3] (such “[n]onstatutory advance directives should be presumed to be valid even in a jurisdiction 
that has enacted advance directive legislation”). 
 26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 765.203, 765.303 (2016) (both stating that the statute’s forms 
“may, but need not,” be used). 
 27. See Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 28, 29 (terming this a conflict between bioethics 
and risk management). 
 28. Cf. In re Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990). In Browning, the Florida 
Supreme Court explained that under the Florida Constitution, the only “viable challenges to her 
guardian’s decision to implement those wishes would have included:” she changed her mind; she 
executed the document under conditions that invalidated it; or she reasonably could regain 
competency. Other evidence, including evidence that she did not meet a statutory physical 
triggering condition “generally would have been irrelevant to the only issue to be decided—the 
patient’s wishes.” Id. at 16–17. 
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that he “absolutely, unequivocally, and vehemently” refuses blood transfusions 
“under any circumstances, regardless of [his] health condition,”29 although the 
applicable statute includes two physical triggering conditions.30 In these 
circumstances, the bioethics response to the question of whether caregivers 
should forego treatment in accordance with the patients’ wishes would be 
affirmative, but risk management’s response likely would be resoundingly 
negative.31 
In other words, the very statutes intended to facilitate patients’ obtaining 
the care they wish, and no more care than they wish, thwart the efforts of those 
who have done all that their lawyers and doctors have advised them to do to 
memorialize instructions for end-of-life care after their incapacity. 
III.  INCORPORATING ETHICS TERMINOLOGY INSTEAD OF PHYSICAL 
TRIGGERING CONDITIONS INTO STATE STATUTES TO BETTER EFFECTUATE 
PATIENT WISHES 
Such physical triggering conditions have multiple purposes. The presence 
of a written advance directive with a patient who satisfies at least one of the 
statutory physical triggering conditions incorporated within it serves as an 
assurance of legality when satisfied.32 If a patient exists in a condition 
specified in the statute, then physicians and other health care professionals 
involved in withholding or withdrawing care at the end of life have a shield 
against liability and potential administrative sanction.33 Going one step further, 
one could view statutory physical triggering conditions as “demarcat[ing] a 
line between legal and illegal activities,”34 thus similarly providing a shield 
against liability, this time criminal rather than civil. 
Importantly, a patient’s failure to exist in one of the statutory physical 
triggering conditions does not imply that treatment must begin or be continued. 
Because most statutes state that they are not intended to preempt common law 
rights, the failure of a particular patient to fit these definitions does not 
necessarily mean that life-sustaining treatment may not be forgone, but only 
that it may not be forgone pursuant to an advance directive drafted in 
conformance with the statute.35 
 
 29. See Lozada Tirado v. Flecha, 2010 WL 446020, at *1 (P.R. Offic. Trans. 2010). 
 30. Puerto Rico’s statute provides that a living will is enforceable only when the patient is in 
a terminal health condition (also referred to as a terminal illness or a persistent vegetative state). 
Lozada, 2010 WL 446020, at *3 (recapping the holding of the Puerto Rican Court of Appeals). 
 31. See generally Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 19–20; see also Samuel W. Wardle, 
The Advance Directive Statute Revisited, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 861, 889 (2013). 
 32. See MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.02, at 7-27. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 12 n.1. 
 35. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.06[A][4], at 7-90. 
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Such a patient’s failure to meet one of the triggering conditions, however, does 
mean that withholding or withdrawal of treatment is problematic for facility 
risk-management personnel and some risk-adverse physicians.36 
Underlying the inclusion of physical triggering conditions in statutes are 
valid and important state interests in preserving life and protecting the 
vulnerable.37 It is easy to understand the perceived threat of a slippery slope if 
a legislature overtly approves withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining 
treatment from incapacitated patients in any physical condition.38 Some 
persons with disabilities, given historical discrimination against and lack of 
understanding of that state of being, would be especially concerned.39 Some 
elderly persons and members of some racial and ethnic minority groups may 
have similar concerns.40 
 
 36. See generally Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 28 (terming this a conflict between 
ethics and risk management). Until recently, the American Medical Association (AMA) Council 
on Ethics and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) explicitly advised AMA members that while other 
documentation of end-of-life wishes can be legally valid, “[s]tatutory documents give physicians 
immunity from malpractice for following a patient’s wishes.” AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON 
ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., CODE OF MED. ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 96 
(2002). As of June 2016, the AMA CEJA revised that opinion to omit references to obtaining 
immunity through statutory advance directive documents. Compare id., with AM. MED. ASS’N 
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., CODE OF MED. ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH 
ANNOTATIONS § 5.2 (2016). The revision, however, was intended to “comprehensively review, 
update and re-organize guidance to ensure that the Code remains a timely, easy to use resource,” 
rather than to memorialize major substantive change. Am. Med. Ass’n Code of Medical Ethics, 
AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics.page (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). Some physicians may not realize for quite a 
while that the CEJA’s opinions no longer reference immunity from malpractice stemming from 
compliance with statutory advance directive documents. See also Wardle, supra note 31, at 873. 
 37. See Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 13 (arguing that the varying triggering 
conditions in different states in part reflect the underlying values of the state). 
 38. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF DISABILITY, AGING, AND 
LONG-TERM CARE POL’Y, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING FOR PEOPLE 
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 9–10 (2007) (quoting advocacy groups arguing that “[t]he 
courts, the political system and the general public must not allow policy to develop that will de-
value any individual, no matter what the extent of that individual’s disability or incapacity”). 
 39. See id. at 7–10 (recounting data regarding discrimination and lack of understanding). See 
also id. at 17 (referencing that there are: 
overriding concerns about under-treatment for serious medical conditions due to: 
  − devaluation of and lack of respect for the lives of people with disabilities; 
  − negative attitudes of health care professionals and the public, including overly 
pessimistic perceptions of quality of life and misconceptions about life satisfaction; and 
  − lack of access to care and services based on discrimination, cost concerns, and 
environmental barriers.) 
 40. Both the elderly and African Americans can point to such a history of discrimination. In 
the 1980s, then-Governor Richard D. Lamm of Colorado famously stated that elderly people with 
terminal illnesses had a “duty to die and get out of the way” rather than undergo life-prolonging 
treatment. See Gov. Lamm Asserts Elderly, if Very Ill, Have ‘Duty to Die,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 
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Despite the validity of such concerns, states can do much better in terms of 
honoring the autonomous decisions of those who have executed advance 
directives. People who have done what they believed necessary to ensure that 
their wishes govern once they are incapacitated should be able to rely on their 
wishes governing. Instead, advance directive statutes that incorporate one or 
more physical states as conditions precedent to the documents’ taking effect 
can undermine patient autonomy. Legislatures may impose conditions as 
reflections of their states’ values41 and in the service of their states’ interests,42 
but they should use ethics terminology instead of diagnostic or prognostic 
terms to do so because the intended limitation of advance directives to persons 
in certain physical conditions is unconstitutional.43 Moreover, using physical 
triggering conditions to represent the edge of the slippery slope is unrealistic, 
ethically problematic, and vague. States should eliminate them, substituting 
language focusing on patient goals and values to better reconcile the law with 
medical ethics. 
A. The Unconstitutionality of Specified Physical Triggering Conditions as 
Limitations on the Exercise of the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining 
Treatment 
Any discussion of unconstitutionality must, of course, begin with the 
identification of a constitutional right. Thereafter, depending on the strength of 
the right in question, the argument must switch to consideration of the strength 
of the interests the state is seeking to advance with its regulation of that right. 
1. Fundamental Constitutional Rights Are at Stake 
A competent person—a person with decision-making capacity44—has a 
liberty interest in directing withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care 
 
1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/29/us/gov-lamm-asserts-elderly-if-very-ill-have-duty-to-
die.html. Medical exploitation of African Americans began long before the famed Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study. See generally Vanessa Northington Gamble, Under the Shadow of Tuskegee: 
African Americans and Health Care, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1773–78 (1997). 
 41. Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 13. 
 42. See Wardle, supra note 31, at 881. 
 43. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 1 § 7.06[A][4], providing: 
  Because most statutes state that they are not intended to preempt common law rights, 
the failure of a particular patient to fit these definitions does not necessarily mean that 
life-sustaining treatment may not be forgone but only that it may not be forgone pursuant 
to an advance directive drafted in accordance with the statute. Careful drafting of advance 
directives might avoid these statutory limitations. 
 44. Although some contexts require specification of whether a patient merely lacks some 
capacity or is fully incompetent, in this setting, both terms are used to describe “those individuals 
unable to make medical decisions on their own behalf.” Kathy L. Cerminara, The Law and Its 
Interaction with Medical Ethics in End-of-Life Decision Making, 140 CHEST 775, 778 (2011); In 
re Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 n. 9 (Fla. 1990). 
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under the Federal Constitution.45 The United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health acknowledged that “[t]he 
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior 
decisions.”46 Justice O’Connor, concurring, agreed and expanded upon that 
statement: “Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our 
idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed 
state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”47 
Crucially, Cruzan did not involve a patient with decision-making capacity 
(a competent patient). Nancy Beth Cruzan was not competent to make her own 
medical decisions, as she had lain in a vegetative state for years after an 
automobile accident that left her without oxygen for at least twelve minutes.48 
Against that backdrop, having assumed the existence of a competent patient’s 
constitutional right, the Court in Cruzan addressed petitioners’ argument that 
“an incompetent person [Nancy] should have the same right [to refuse life-
sustaining treatment] as is possessed by a competent person.”49 The Court 
neither agreed nor disagreed. Instead, it conflated the existence of the right 
with the ability to exercise the right, saying: 
The difficulty with petitioners’ claim is that in a sense it begs the question: An 
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to 
exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 
‘right’ must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.50 
 
 45. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n. 7 (1990) (distinguishing 
liberty interest from the right of privacy). 
 46. Id. at 279. The Court then said: 
  Although we think the logic of the cases discussed above would embrace such a 
liberty interest, the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would 
inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally 
permissible. But for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution 
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving 
hydration and nutrition. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court in Glucksberg later described this statement as “assum[ing] and 
strongly suggest[ing]” the existence of such a right. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997). 
 47. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). After explaining that medically 
supplied nutrition and hydration implicated “identical concerns” as other forms of medical 
treatment, O’Connor added that “the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, 
if it protects anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, 
including the artificial delivery of food and water.” Id. at 288–89. 
 48. Id. at 266 (majority opinion). 
 49. Id. at 279. 
 50. Id. at 280 (emphasis added). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] GIVE ME LIBERTY TO CHOOSE (A BETTER) DEATH 77 
Dissecting the Court’s conflation is important, for it demonstrates the 
difference between the facts at issue in Cruzan and the focus of this article. It 
was inaccurate to see Nancy Cruzan as not having made a choice because she 
had left behind oral advance directives, which her parents were attempting to 
honor.51 But thinking carefully about the emphasized language leads to the 
conclusion that the Court believed that a person without a written advance 
directive (like Nancy) had in fact not yet made a choice regarding end-of-life 
treatment. To maintain its focus on those who have executed written advance 
directives, this article will not challenge that belief, although it seems 
inconceivable that all of the millions of Americans lacking written advance 
directives have failed to make decisions about their end-of-life preferences.52 
Rather, the importance of the assumption reflected in the emphasized 
language is that in contrast to the class of incompetent patients before the 
Court in Cruzan, there exists no rational argument that the class of incompetent 
patients at issue in this article, those who have written advance directives, have 
failed to make their own choices regarding end-of-life care. As noted earlier, 
advance directives are intended to memorialize a choice a patient has already 
made to facilitate the fulfillment of her previously determined wishes.53 
Patients with written advance directives, who are the only patients at issue in 
this article, have already chosen when they were competent, and they have 
memorialized their decisions for others to implement.54 Such a patient had the 
constitutional right to make the anticipatory choice when she made it, and now 
the surrogate decision maker’s job is to implement the patient’s decision. 
Indeed, the Cruzan Court noted that it did not face “the question whether a 
[s]tate might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if competent 
and probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a 
desire that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for her 
by that individual.”55 Justice O’Connor, in concurrence, went one step further, 
 
 51. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268. 
 52. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY 
AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 125, 126 (2014). The data set 
forth in that groundbreaking report, in fact, demonstrated that many more Americans had 
discussed care preferences with loved ones than had executed advance directives. Id. at 127 tbl. 3-
1; see also Lozada Tirado v. Flecha, 2010 WL 446020, at *11 (P.R. Offic. Trans. 2010) (a 
surrogate is “an additional instrument to guarantee that a patient’s wish to accept or refuse 
medical treatment is respected even when he or she is unconscious”) (emphasis added). 
 53. See supra Part I. 
 54. The question is not about whether a right exists, but about “who will exercise this right 
and what parameters will limit them in the exercise of this right.” In re Browning v. Herbert, 568 
So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990); see also id. at 13 (holding that because Mrs. Browning was unable to 
exercise her constitutional right, her guardian could do that for her). 
 55. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 n. 12. The Court later explained: 
  In this Court, the question is simply and starkly whether the United States 
Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of decision which it did. This is 
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explaining: “I . . . write separately to emphasize that the Court does not today 
decide the issue whether a [s]tate must also give effect to the decisions of a 
surrogate decisionmaker. In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally 
required to protect the patient’s liberty interest in refusing medical 
treatment.”56 Thus, she said, Cruzan “does not preclude a future determination 
that the Constitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a 
patient’s duly appointed surrogate.”57 
Justice O’Connor and the Court appear to be discussing proxy directives in 
these quotations. Recall that advance directives can either leave instructions, 
appoint someone to act for the patient after she has lost decision-making 
capacity, or both.58 Either way, the patient with an advance directive has 
already made a decision about her end-of-life treatment choices; she may have 
decided what she wanted and did not want and left instructions to that effect, or 
she may have decided whom she trusted to speak for her after she lost capacity 
and provided that person’s name for others. She also may have done both in 
one document.59 She has already made important end-of-life choices, choices 
she had a constitutional liberty interest in making and having carried out. 
Moreover, the patient’s right to so decide is fundamental. Since addressing 
the liberty interest in end-of-life decision making in two important cases in the 
1990s,60 the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the same right, the Due 
Process interest in liberty, in an expansive way in a series of decisions relating 
to sexual relationships and marriage.61 A patient’s interests in bodily control 
and the ability to safeguard her dignity through end-of-life decision making are 
at least as important as the decision to marry. These interests closely resemble 
decision making about “procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education.”62 Like those matters, the question of when a patient 
believes her life support should be withheld or withdrawn 
 
the first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the United 
States Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as a “right to die.” We 
follow the judicious counsel of our decision [citation omitted], where we said that in 
deciding “a question of such magnitude and importance . . . it is the [better] part of 
wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the 
subject.” 
Id. at 277–78 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 57. Id. at 292. 
 58. See supra Part I.A. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See generally Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266 
(majority opinion). 
 61. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 2 (2015) (gay marriage); 
U.S. v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 1 (2013) (sexual relations between persons of the same 
gender). 
 62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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involve[es] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.63 
Moreover, “as patients are likely to select a family member as a surrogate, . . . 
giving effect to a proxy’s decisions may also protect the ‘freedom of personal 
choice in matters of . . . family life.’”64 As the Court recently explained in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Constitution extends beyond the enumerated rights 
in the Bill of Rights to guarantee these types of choices: “personal choices 
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs.”65 Thus, liberty is more than mere 
freedom from physical restraint, although that freedom certainly is an 
important part of the interest.66 Both the liberty of choice and the liberty of 
avoiding physical restraint play important roles in the end-of-life care of those 
stricken with serious illness. 
One may argue that the Constitution protects warring rights in these 
situations—that due process seems to be at odds with itself in these cases 
because the liberty to refuse treatment will ultimately result in loss of life. At 
the root of liberty, however, is “the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”67 
The refusal of life-prolonging treatment, which intrudes upon a patient’s bodily 
integrity, permits a patient to both determine the boundaries of her existence 
and free herself from physical restraint in the form of that treatment. In that 
setting, an unduly expansive view of the right to life can diminish the right to 
liberty to a level below that which is constitutionally guaranteed. 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted); see also id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that dying 
traditionally takes place at home, as part of a fundamental and “private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter,” and as an incident of “liberty to make the decisions and choices 
constitutive of private life”); id. at 341 n. 12, 344 (referencing a “special relationship between the 
patient and the physician” and an interest in how others will think of oneself after death). 
 65. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 10. 
 66. Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term “Liberty” in Those Clauses in the 
Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect “Life, Liberty, and Property,” 4 HARV. L. REV. 
365, 382 (1890). 
 67. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 244, 278 (2003) (holding that “[t]he State cannot demean [gays’ and lesbians’] existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime”), relied upon in Obergefell, 
No. 14-556, slip op. at 22. 
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The Obergefell Court instructed: 
The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of 
the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, 
‘has not been reduced to any formula.’ Rather, it requires courts to exercise 
reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that 
the State must accord them its respect . . . . History and tradition guide and 
discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.68 
The depth and breadth of liberty protected by Obergefell and the approach the 
Court used to identify a fundamental right in that case demonstrate that the 
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is located firmly within the 
range of “interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord 
them its respect.”69 Not only does that right have a strong and long history of 
respect,70 but it also displays “essential attributes . . . based in history, 
tradition, and other constitutional liberties inherent” within it.71 
Part of the history and tradition of the fundamental federal constitutional 
right to refuse life-prolonging treatment is a long legal history of state 
constitutional protection of that same right. While not the focus of this article, 
state constitutional law, in addition to revealing a historical basis for the 
federal constitutional right, separately provides a strong weapon to use in 
guarding against the use of physical triggering conditions in state advance 
directive statutes to thwart patients’ wishes. Some state constitutions are more 
clear and expansive in their constitutional protection of liberty interests as a 
substantive due process matter than the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Federal Constitution to be. 
In 2010, for example, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico ruled that physical 
triggering conditions in Puerto Rico’s living will statute were unconstitutional 
under the Puerto Rican and the U.S. Constitutions.72 The Puerto Rican 
Constitution, according to that court, “enshrines the cardinal principle of the 
inviolability of human dignity.”73 It also “recognizes the right to privacy and 
the right to the protection of law against abusive attacks on the honor, 
 
 68. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 10 (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. at 10–11. 
 70. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–77 (1990) (discussing 
lengthy legal history of support for the right to refuse treatment). 
 71. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 12. 
 72. See Lozada Tirado v. Flecha, 2010 WL 446020, at *5 (P.R. Offic. Trans. 2010). 
Although technically not a state, Puerto Rico is analogous to a state in the sense of the 
relationship between its constitution and the Federal Constitution. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 24–27 
(1994). 
 73. See Lozada, 2010 WL 446020, at *2 (describing article II, section I of the Puerto Rican 
Constitution). 
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reputation, and private or family life as fundamental rights.”74 State action is 
not required; “the right to privacy imposes on every person the duty to refrain 
from interfering with the private or family life of other human beings.”75 The 
Puerto Rican Constitution is also infringed “when, among other circumstances, 
limitations are placed on an individual’s faculty to make personal, family, or 
private decisions.”76 
Those rights are so strong in the Puerto Rican Constitution that the Puerto 
Rican Supreme Court has held they not only prevent the state “from acting in a 
manner that violates the scope of individual freedom and privacy” but also 
require the state to “take positive action in [sic] behalf of the individual.”77 
This may be due to civil law influence in Puerto Rico’s history,78 but it is also 
another example of the general proposition that state constitutional rights can 
be broader than federal constitutional rights.79 
States without civil law traditions also have constitutions that are broader 
than the Federal Constitution with respect to decisional privacy or liberty. 
Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution, for example, provides: “Every 
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental 
intrusion into [the person’s] private life except as otherwise provided herein.”80 
The Florida Supreme Court has explained: 
[T]he concept of privacy encompasses much more than the right to control the 
disclosure of information about oneself. “Privacy” has been used 
interchangeably with the common understanding of the notion of “liberty, and 
both imply a fundamental right to self-determination subject only to the state’s 
compelling and overriding interest.81 
Recognizing that individuals’ rights to physical and psychological freedom 
from coercion in decision making are “deeply rooted in our nation’s 
philosophical and political heritage,”82 that court has held: “We can conceive 
of few more personal or private decisions concerning one’s body that one can 
 
 74. Id. at *5. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-
Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923 (2011) 
(addressing the implications of jurisdictions strongly influenced by civil law such as Puerto Rico). 
 79. See id. at 927–30 (addressing states’ incorporation of socio-economic rights that are not 
traditionally provided at the federal level, thus indicating states’ constitutions providing broader 
rights than that of the Federal Constitution). 
 80. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 81. In re Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 9–10 (Fla. 1990). 
 82. Id. at 10. 
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make in the course of a lifetime . . . [than] the decision of the terminally ill in 
their choice of whether to discontinue necessary medical treatment.”83 
2. State Interests Underlying the Specification of Physical Triggering 
Conditions 
A state may, of course, only limit the exercise of a fundamental 
constitutional right if the limitations it imposes serve one or more compelling 
state interests and are “narrowly tailored” to serve that interest or those 
interests.84 In Cruzan, only one state interest was at issue: the state’s interest in 
the preservation of life.85 By announcing that Missouri could rightfully assert 
an “unqualified interest” in protecting life, not just an interest in protecting life 
of a certain sapience, the Cruzan Court implied that the state interest in 
preservation of life can be compelling even if the life of the patient in question 
consists of only heartbeat and respiration.86 Yet, while a state interest can be 
compelling, it cannot be absolute. Life and liberty must ultimately balance, 
without reducing decision-making freedom to an unacceptably low level. 
The Cruzan Court viewed the requirement that the petitioners produce 
clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s stated desire to refuse that 
particular treatment under those particular circumstances as “a procedural 
safeguard to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as best it may to 
the wishes expressed by the patient while competent.”87 It decided that 
Missouri had not violated the Constitution by imposing a heavy burden of 
proof because “[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal 
decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may 
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the 
imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements.”88 In other words, Missouri 
could impose evidentiary hurdles in the name of ensuring that the decision to 
withhold or withdraw treatment was in fact the patient’s own decision, in a 
 
 83. Id. (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)). 
 84. Id. at 14. 
 85. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) 
 86. Compare Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 (stating that the state interest in life can be compelling 
in patient’s in any health) with In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (ruling that the 
state’s interest waned “as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims”). 
 87. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
 88. Id. at 281. Specifically, the court held that Missouri could decide such protections were 
necessary to: (1) ensure that patients are being abused by the decision-maker through removal or 
withholding of treatment, (2) make up for the fact that the judicial proceeding approving the 
withdrawal/withholding might not be adversarial, and (3) preserve life, in which it could assert an 
“unqualified interest,” not one that wanes when the patient gets sicker and the bodily invasion 
grows. Id. at 281–82. These are all state choices, within the state’s power. But they are not 
required; they are merely permissible. Id.; see also id. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“As the 
majority recognizes, [citation omitted], the question is not whether an incompetent has 
constitutional rights, but how such rights may be exercised.”). 
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case in which the patient had not appointed her own surrogate. If a patient with 
capacity makes the decision before losing capacity, however, fewer safeguards 
are necessary. Physical triggering conditions are not necessary; what is 
necessary is an inquiry into whether there is evidence that the patient’s 
previous choice should not apply to the facts at hand. As the Florida Supreme 
Court has stated regarding that state’s constitutional right: “A competent 
individual has the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment regardless of 
his or her medical condition.”89 
States also have interests in protecting vulnerable populations.90 The 
Cruzan Court did not discuss such populations specifically as it acknowledged 
a state interest in “legitimately seek[ing] to safeguard the personal element of 
this choice.”91 It did, however, explicitly recognize a state interest in protecting 
patients with no family members or friends to speak for them and those with 
family members who do not have their best interests at heart, especially in the 
medical decision-making setting, which is not always (or even often) 
adversarial.92 A few years later, in a different end-of-life decision-making 
context, the Court more specifically described populations that states may wish 
to protect as “including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons.”93 There, it 
agreed that a state statute prohibiting physician aid in dying94 could serve an 
interest in protecting such “disadvantaged persons” from being coerced into 
making certain end-of-life decisions.95 For the sake of completeness, although 
criminal statutes prohibiting physician aid in dying differ greatly from civil 
statutes permitting citizens to memorialize their end-of-life treatment wishes, 
this article will consider all of those groups because both types of statutes 
relate to medical decisions about the end of life. 
In advance directive statutes, physical triggering conditions are intended to 
serve as fences, preventing a tumble down the slippery slope. If only those who 
satisfy the triggering conditions may have life-sustaining treatment withheld or 
withdrawn, then the reasoning goes that there is no risk that persons in other 
 
 89. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10; see also Wardle, supra note 31, at 869 n. 7 (arguing 
that Florida’s statute is unconstitutional under Browning for this reason). 
 90. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (discussing a different context, 
physician aid-in-dying). 
 91. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731. Deciding a withholding/withdrawal case, the Florida 
Supreme Court in Browning seemed to address this interest when it addressed the “‘very 
legitimate concern’ that the ‘right to die’ could become a license to kill.” In re Browning, 568 So. 
2d at 13 (quoting the District Court of Appeals, 543 So.2d 258, 269 (1989)). 
 94. “With aid in dying, a physician writes a prescription for life-ending medication for an 
eligible patient.” David Orentlicher et al., The Changing Legal Landscape of Aid in Dying, 311 
JAMA 1961, 1961 (2014). The American Public Health Association recommends use of the term 
aid in dying rather than the term “assisted suicide.” Id. 
 95. . Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731–32. 
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conditions, especially those society undervalues, will have their life-sustaining 
treatment withheld or withdrawn against their wishes.96 
Concern about the slippery slope is especially important in light of the 
disability critique of mainstream bioethics and law.97 History provides ample 
evidence that persons with disabilities, like those of other minority groups, 
have experienced discrimination. Just as African Americans may respond, even 
if subconsciously, to a collective memory of Tuskegee with present-day 
mistrust of the medical system,98 so too may persons with disabilities feel the 
legacy of past mistreatment in Nazi Germany’s Action T4 when anticipating 
how today’s medical decision-making laws will affect them.99 (The concerns 
do not differ fundamentally from those motivating federal regulations 
governing treatment of infants born under a certain weight (the so-called 
“Baby Doe” regulations).100 To the extent that persons with disabilities 
perceive mainstream bioethics and most lawmakers as harboring such 
prejudices against them, the presence of physical triggering conditions—
requiring that a patient be in one of a few physical states—is assurance that 
 
 96. Cf. Orentlicher et al., supra note 94, at 1962 (explaining that the term “grim prognosis” 
in the Karen Ann Quinlan case was not specific enough to quell fears that assumptions would be 
made about a person’s quality of life in making end-of-life decisions). 
 97. Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 26; see also ALICIA OUELLETTE, BIOETHICS AND 
DISABILITY: TOWARD A DISABILITY-CONSCIOUS BIOETHICS 297–98 (2011); A Statement of 
Common Principles on Life-Sustaining Care and Treatment of People with Disabilities, 
SYRACUSE UNIV. CTR. ON HUM. POL’Y, http://thechp.syr.edu/resources/position-statements/life-
sustaining-care/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016); cf. Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted 
Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 141, 167 (1987). 
 98. In the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, United States governmental public health researchers 
followed the course of syphilis among a population of African American men without providing 
treatment even after effective treatment was available, and under the guise of providing treatment. 
See FRED D. GRAY, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: THE REAL STORY AND BEYOND 24 (1998); 
STEPHEN B. THOMAS & SANDRA CROUSE, TUSKEGEE’S TRUTH: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS STUDY 405 (Susan R. Reverby ed., 2000). It bears noting, however, that the history of 
medical exploitation of African Americans reaches much further back than Tuskegee. See 
Gamble, supra note 40, at 1773; Catherine M. Waters, Understanding and Supporting African 
Americans’ Perspectives of End-of-Life Care Planning and Decision Making, 11 QUALITY 
HEALTH RES. 385, 386 (2001). 
 99. See Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing the “Third Reich’s T4 euthanasia 
program”); Lee Hudson, From Small Beginnings: The Euthanasia of Children With Disabilities 
in Nazi Germany, 47 J. PEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 508, 509, 511 (2011) (describing the 
beginnings of the program, with severely disabled children); Kristen Iannuzzi, Nazi Euthanasia 
and Action T4: Effects on the Ethical Treatment of Individuals With Disabilities 25 (Apr. 4, 
2014) (unpublished student paper, Grand Valley State University) (on file with Grand Valley 
State University’s “ScholarWorks@GVSU” program). 
 100. See generally Michael White, The End at the Beginning, 11 OSCHNER J. 309, 309 (2011) 
(describing concern about discriminatory motive underling decision not to treat newborn with 
disabilities). 
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life-sustaining treatment will not be withheld or withdrawn from them because 
of their disabilities. 
Persons with disabilities point out, accurately, that persons without 
disabilities tend to underestimate the quality of life persons with disabilities 
ascribe to their own lives.101 The use of the unfortunate label “vegetative” to 
describe a lack of cognition has led at least one person with disabilities to 
protest that she was not “a cabbage, an onion, . . . a cob of corn.”102 Some 
argue that it is difficult to predict one’s own beliefs when in a future state of 
disability because the capacitated person who executes an advance directive is 
not the same person who lies incapacitated at the time that advance directive is 
operationalized.103 
Countering that evidence and argument, however, is evidence indicating 
otherwise. For example, a recent major study of cancer patients and their 
caregivers reveals that, if anything, caregivers want to give more aggressive 
treatment than patients would choose (other than pain control).104 A person 
who is in a vegetative state may present a more troubling case than a cancer 
patient because the vegetative-state patient is not necessarily near the end of 
life and does not experience the severe, untreatable pain many cancer patients 
experience. But recall also that this article is only considering people who have 
 
 101. SHEPHERD, supra note 24, at 130 (“Studies show that ‘more abled’ people repeatedly 
express their belief that life with certain kinds of disabilities are not worth living.”). This is true 
of both people in general and health care professionals. Id. See also Parker & Goldberg, supra 
note 7, at 26. Dean Ouellette describes Paul Longmore’s discussion of “rampant prejudice” 
against those with disabilities: “Disability is often equated with terminal illness and even viewed 
as ‘living death.’” OUELLETTE, supra note 97, at 294 (quoting PAUL K. LONGMORE, THE 
DISABILITY RIGHTS OPPOSITION TO ASSISTED SUICIDE EXPLAINED AND CRITIQUED 151 
(Timothy Lillie & James L. Werth eds., 2007)). 
 102. Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay: Musings on the Need to Convince Some People with 
Disabilities that End-of-Life Decision-Making Advocates are Not Out to Get Them, 37 LOY. U. 
CHI. L. J. 343, 343 (2006). 
 103. See generally SHEPHERD, supra note 24, at 180 (asking, “Should the fact that I would no 
longer be ‘myself’ mean that the ‘altered self’ I had become should not live?”). See also, e.g., 
Rebecca Dresser, Toward a Humane Death with Dementia, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38, 39 (2014) 
(describing one advance directive proposal as “empower[ing] [a] competent person[] to impose 
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previously expressed their own wishes in written advance directives. Persons 
who have not done so similarly are entitled to have their wishes respected, but 
they are not at issue in this article. As Alicia Ouellette has said referring to 
both populations: “A person with disabilities should no more be denied access 
to treatment refusal than a person without disabilities.”105 She explains, 
“Protecting people with disabilities from unscrupulous surrogates, outright 
discrimination, and negative social attitudes should be central concerns of a 
just medical system. [But] [e]nsuring equal opportunity [of choice], providing 
adequate pain relief, and preventing physical suffering are no less important 
goals.”106 
Similar reasoning applies to the poor and the elderly, two other vulnerable 
populations the Supreme Court has addressed in the context of end-of-life 
decision making. History may counsel that society be on guard against 
exploitation and discrimination,107 but that does not justify denying persons 
within those populations the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment even if 
they are not in precisely the physical condition(s) a legislature envisioned in its 
advance directive statute. Given that this article addresses only persons who 
have executed written advance directives, persons who feel vulnerable due to 
disability, old age, racial or ethnic minority status, or poor economic 
circumstances can be as specific as they like about the physical triggering 
conditions they wish to put in place to protect themselves. The choice is theirs, 
to be expressed in their own advance directives if they wish to and are able to 
execute a written advance directive; it is not the state’s choice to apply to 
everyone by inclusion in a statute. 
Other answers to these dilemmas lie partly in existing law and partly in the 
proposal at hand. First, as to existing law, heightened evidentiary standards and 
third-party (judicial) review serve as safeguards against decisions being made 
inconsistently with patient desires.108 Second, this article does not suggest that 
the law should dispose of all triggering conditions. Rather, as discussed below, 
it suggests that the law should cease focusing simplistically on specified 
physical triggering conditions and instead should spotlight the real matter in 
question: patient intent.109 
Before reaching that point, however, a recap is in order. Under the Federal 
Constitution, the liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment is 
 
 105. OULLETTE, supra note 97, at 311. 
 106. Id. at 314. 
 107. In the 1980s, then-Governor Richard D. Lamm of Colorado famously stated that elderly 
people with terminal illnesses had a “duty to die and get out of the way.” See N.Y. TIMES, supra 
note 40. Additionally, it bears mention that medical exploitation of African Americans began 
long before the famed Tuskegee Syphilis Study. See Gamble, supra note 40, at 1173–74. 
 108. OULLETTE, supra note 97 (discussing Norman Cantor’s work). 
 109. See Wardle, supra note 31, at 862; In re Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 
1990) (the “only issue to be decided” was “the patient’s wishes”). 
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fundamental. Limiting the exercise of that right to instances in which 
incompetent patients lie in certain specified physical triggering conditions 
neither serves a compelling state interest nor is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
withstand scrutiny. Even on the facts of Cruzan, with an incompetent patient 
lacking a written advance directive, four Justices would have invalidated as 
unconstitutional the high burden of proof Missouri had imposed to protect the 
patient.110 When the patient in question has expressed her wishes in an advance 
directive, the presence of the advance directive is “significant”111 and serves 
itself to protect the patient. In that situation, efforts to uphold state interests by 
limiting exercise of the right to patients in particular, simplistically expressed, 
physical conditions are unnecessary and unconstitutional. 
B. Additional Support for the Substitution of Ethics Language for Physical 
Triggering Conditions in Advance Directive Statutes 
The above analysis demonstrates that incorporating specified physical 
triggering conditions into advance directive statutes is unconstitutional. No one 
intends to authorize withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in a 
setting in which a patient would not want that withholding or withdrawal. At 
the same time, however, a legislature may not limit the right to refuse to cases 
in which patients suffer from particular physical triggering conditions. Rather, 
the key inquiry is whether the patient lies in a condition in which that patient 
did not want treatment. Specifying physical triggering conditions for advance 
directive operation is a poor proxy for an investigation into patient intent. 
Substituting patient-intent focused language for the current specification of 
physical triggering conditions will reframe the inquiry to consider patient 
concerns as a focal point. Reframing the inquiry in that fashion will encourage 
debates about more meaningful matters than the physical condition(s) that 
particular state believes justify withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment. 
Such substitution of focus on patient intent for a focus on a state’s chosen 
physical conditions enhances the involvement of a previously unmentioned 
safeguard against going down the slippery slope: the medical profession. 
Physicians’ ethical codes obligate them to concentrate on patient intent rather 
than statutory physical triggering conditions.112 The Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs (CEJA) of the American Medical Association (AMA) advises 
its members that in considering—along with a surrogate—whether to carry out 
the wishes expressed in a patient’s advance directive, the first task is not to 
 
 110. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 301–57 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting & Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 111. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13. “Significantly, the patients in both cases, while 
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 112. Parker & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 23. 
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determine whether the patient’s condition meets any statutory physical 
triggering condition. Instead, the task is to determine whether the patient is in a 
physical condition specified in that advance directive, if any is specified.113 In 
the absence of a stated physical condition in the advance directive, AMA 
member physicians are to rely on evidence of “the patient’s values, goals for 
care, and treatment preferences.”114 There are only three situations in which 
the CEJA advises AMA member physicians that they should seek an ethics 
consult: (1) when the surrogate and the health care team cannot agree; (2) in 
the absence of a ready, willing, and able surrogate; and (3) if the surrogate’s 
decision “clearly violates the patient’s previously expressed values, goals for 
care, or treatment preferences, or is not in the patient’s medical interest.”115 
This, as J. Clint Parker and Daniel Goldberg indicate,116 is equivalent to the 
legal search for evidence of the patient’s subjective wishes, then evidence 
supporting a substituted judgment, and then, only if necessary, evidence of 
what course of action would be in the patient’s best interests.117 Statutory 
physical triggering conditions are not part of the equation. 
The American Osteopathic Association echoes these principles, advising 
its members, without referring to patients’ physical conditions, that they should 
inquire: “If the patient were to awaken and be able to fully understand the 
circumstances, what decisions would the patient make? If the answer is clear, it 
is unethical, except in extraordinary circumstances, not to follow the patient’s 
wishes.”118 There is no intervening step requiring reference to the law to 
decide whether the patient meets a statutory physical triggering condition. Care 
of a patient nearing the end of life involves many physicians and other health 
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care professionals, and their ethical codes generally are similar in purpose and 
effect. 
What is ethical may not be legal, and vice versa, but in this case, the law’s 
addition of specific triggering conditions on top of the medical profession’s 
ethical obligation to honor patient wishes is not only contrary to medical ethics 
but also contrary to the patient’s constitutional right to have her wishes prevail. 
Parker and Goldberg even argue that imposing triggering conditions is “an 
intrusion by the state into the patient–physician relationship.”119 Those two 
physicians note: 
The medical profession has an interest in preventing the premature death of 
patients—an interest at least as strong as the state’s since preventing the 
premature death of patients is arguably one of the fundamental, defining goals 
of the medical profession. Acting in the best interest of patients is a defining 
characteristic of what it means to be a medical professional . . . .120 
Some statutory triggering conditions do not even properly reflect the 
medical judgments being applied at the bedside now (as opposed, perhaps, to 
when they were drafted). Most, if not all, states that incorporate a vegetative 
state triggering condition use the term persistent vegetative state, but it is likely 
that none of them actually mean the state should be persistent. They mean the 
state should be permanent.121 The neurological definitions of the terms 
persistent vegetative state and permanent vegetative state rely on temporality; a 
person in a persistent vegetative state cannot be said to be in a permanent 
vegetative state until either three months or a year has passed, depending on 
the cause of injury.122 As another example, under the terms of the Tennessee 
statute, persons with terminal illnesses include those in persistent vegetative 
states.123 Yet, because persons in vegetative states can live for decades, 
neurologists do not consider them to be terminally ill.124 
In addition, scientific advances are teaching us that terms that seem 
definitive and exact may not be so clear. Recent research with functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, for example, shows us that a vegetative state 
diagnosis may not reflect the condition state legislatures envisioned.125 That 
research is in early stages, but the overall point is that as technology advances, 
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the precise meaning of certain labels may change, yet patients’ views of when 
they know “it’s the end” probably do not change, whatever “it” is called.126 
Other options that better honor both patient rights and medical ethics could 
include eliminating specified physical triggering conditions in favor of 
language such as “a condition from which there can be no recovery” to 
preserve the edge of the slippery slope. A person may choose to state simply 
that she wishes to refuse life-sustaining treatment when she “would find 
continued existence unbearable if she were able to experience it,” and then 
trust a surrogate to know when that point is. Statutory language could read 
something like this example, adapted from a portion of the Pennsylvania 
statute: 
Except as specifically set forth in an advance health care directive, [the 
document] is not intended to preclude treatment of a disease, illness or 
physical, mental, cognitive or intellectual condition, even if incurable and 
irreversible and regardless of severity, if both of the following apply: (1) The 
patient would benefit from the medical treatment, including palliative care. (2) 
Such treatment would not merely prolong the process of dying.127 
States alternatively may wish to protect those with intellectual or cognitive 
disabilities by including statutory language specifically prohibiting the 
operation of advance directives for withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from patients “who are mentally incapacitated but 
physically are in good health.”128 
The final suggestion this article will offer is that instead of relying on 
physical triggering conditions, a state could require as part of its advance 
directive completion process that the person executing the directive complete 
and attach one of a variety of validated advisory documents. These documents 
are worksheets created to facilitate advance care planning by presenting 
scenarios and seeking information about the patient’s goals and values.129 
Physicians are urged to use these sorts of worksheets in counseling patients on 
end-of-life decision making; until recently, the AMA CEJA recommended that 
its members, when engaging in advance care planning with their patients, 
“make use of advisory as well as statutory documents . . . . Advisory 
documents should be based on validated worksheets, thus ensuring reasonable 
confidence that preferences for end-of-life treatment can be fairly and 
 
 126. For example, being in a minimally conscious state may be “horrifying” to some people, 
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effectively elicited and recorded, and that they are applicable to medical 
decisions.”130 
In sum, rather than serving state interests in shorthand fashion through 
reference to physical triggering conditions instead of patient intent, statutory 
advance directive language should more closely match the fruits of clinicians’ 
advance care planning efforts. 
This approach to statutory drafting, although perhaps seeming less certain 
than use of specified medical conditions, is more descriptive and thus more 
precisely targeted. Such language is clearer than the specification of physical 
triggering conditions because those conditions often are not as definitive as 
they sound. Florida’s definition of terminal condition is “a condition caused by 
injury, disease, or illness from which there is no reasonable medical probability 
of recovery and which without treatment, can be expected to cause death.”131 
In Missouri, a terminal condition is “an incurable or irreversible condition 
which, in the opinion of the attending physician, is such that death will occur 
within a short time regardless of the application of medical procedures.”132 A 
patient in either of those conditions, however, is terminally ill so as to obtain 
Medicare payment for hospice services when he or she “has a medical 
prognosis that his or her life expectancy is [six] months or less if the illness 
runs its normal course.”133 The question is what the person executing an 
advance directive thinks terminal illness is, and she probably does not examine 
statutory definitions. The situation in which patients wish to refuse continued 
treatment is a matter of “I know it when I see it,” and each person knows it 
when she sees it for herself. 
This approach also would account for the reality of conversational English. 
Rather than categorizing specific physical conditions as acceptable or 
unacceptable, persons expressing their end-of-life wishes make statements like 
they “never want[] to be that way,”134 “[d]on’t do to me what you did to your 
mother,”135 or I don’t “want to spend [my] life lying in bed and looking at the 
wall.”136 “The right to be free from unwanted medical attention is a right to 
evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its possible consequences 
according to one’s own values and to make a personal decision whether to 
subject oneself to the intrusion.”137 When a patient has taken the time and 
trouble to do that, and to memorialize the decision in writing, the state should 
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not impose its views of whether the patient is in a condition meriting 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment by specifying physical conditions that 
must be satisfied to give effect to the patient’s advance directive. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Advance directives are instruments of personal preference regarding end-
of-life medical treatment. Both persons who have and those who have not set 
forth their preferences in writing are entitled to have their wishes govern their 
end-of-life medical care. Especially when they have done so, however, the 
state has no role in determining when they can refuse treatment. State 
determinations that only persons in one or more physical triggering conditions 
may refuse life-prolonging treatment are inconsistent with the U.S. 
Constitution and unwise for a variety of reasons. 
Rather than continue this poor policy practice, states should amend their 
advance directive statutes to more closely reflect the result of clinicians’ 
advance care planning processes. As many already have with Physician Orders 
for Life-Sustaining Treatment,138 states should recognize and honor the 
foundation of all end-of-life medical decision-making law: patient wishes. 
Doing so is natural and appropriate because one of the state interests in play—
one that has received less and less attention in the area of withholding or 
withdrawing treatment over the years—is maintenance of the integrity of 
medical ethics. It is difficult to imagine a better way to honor and ensure the 
integrity of medical ethics in this area than by using medical ethical constructs 
to focus on patient intent rather than determinations of the presence of a 
particular physical triggering condition. Just as the earliest reported appellate 
court decision regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment looked to 
medical ethics as a guide,139 so should the law now, a few generations into the 
development of written advance directives. Doing so will improve end-of-life 
care and serve as an expression of a more caring medical and legal culture.140 
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